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LEGISLATIVE NOTE
'PUBLIC ACT 78-1250:
IS THE ATTEMPTED EXEMPTION VALID
Taxation of personal property has long been a source of frustration for
both the government and the taxpayer. This article deals with a possible
problem in the most recent attempt of the General Assembly to further re-
duce the ad valorem taxation of personal property. As will be evident later,
this action by the General Assembly is certain to produce litigation on the
validity of exempting trustees and other fiduciaries within the limited context
of the act without a provision for replacing the revenue lost. This article at-
tempts to examine problem areas of the legislation and present a plausible
and persuasive case for holding the act to be a clarification of prior legisla-
tion and not a totally new exemption. In order to fully understand -the dis-
tinction drawn and the act's vulnerability to attack without a revenue replace-
ment provision, it is mandatory to review the General Assembly's past efforts
to exempt certain property from taxation and the court's construction of those
attempts.
PUBLIC ACT 78-1250
By letter dated September 7, 1974, Governor Daniel Walker allowed
House Bill 2049 to become law without his signature.' Although it is rela-
tively short in length, H.B. 2049 is certain to produce litigation as to its valid-
ity under the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
H.B. 2049 enacted as Public Act 78-1250 adds a new exemption to the
steadily decreasing personal property tax. The Act amends Chapter 120 by
adding paragraph 500.21b which exempts property held "by a trustee, guard-
ian, conservator, executor, administrator or other fiduciary to the extent held
for the exclusive benefit of a natural person." This amendment was appar-
ently brought about by the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of Article
IX-A of the 1870 Illinois Constitution, which was adopted by referendum
in November of 1970. Prior to the adoption of article IX-A, all personal
property owned by individuals within the state was taxed. Each household
was given an exemption for their household furnishings and one automobile.2
1. This method of approving legislation is provided for pursuant to article IV, sec-
tion 9(b) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. It has been little used by the current
Governor.
2. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 499 (1939).
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Chapter 120 §§ 528, et. seq., requires the taxpayer to inventory his non-
exempt personal property each year. This inventory is to be filed with the
local assessor between April 1 and June 1 each year. After the inventory
is filed, the assessor is then required to assess the value of the property and
enter that assessment upon his records. The assessor must then deliver the
books to the local collector, either a town collector or in his absence the
county collector, who then issues the tax bills. A taxpayer, if he objects to
the assessment, must proceed to pay the tax under protest. Notice of pay-
ment under protest is given to the collector. Thereafter the taxpayer must
file a petition with the circuit court of the county where the payment was
made naming as defendants the collector and other related local officials.
Thereafter, the hearing proceeds as in other civil hearings and judgment ren-
dered accordingly.
ARTICLE IX-A OF THE 1870 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION
Article IX-A of the 1870 Illinois Constitution, adopted in November of
1970, prohibited the taxation of personal property by valuation as to individ-
uals. Appearing on the referendum ballot with the proposal was a brief ex-
planation of the intent of the proposal. That explanation stated: "The
amendment would abolish the personal property tax by valuation levied
against individuals. It would not affect the same tax levied against corpora-
tions and other entities not considered in law to be individuals." 8
Prior to submission of the amendment to referendum, both the House
and Senate set forth their intent as to the meaning of the word "individuals."
Their expressed feeling was that
[I]t was the intention of the General Assembly to abolish the ad
valorem taxation of personal property owned by a natural person
or two or more natural persons, and that by the use of the phrase
'as to individuals' this General Assembly intended to mean a nat-
ural person, or two or more natural persons as joint tenants or
tenants in common. 4
The validity of article IX-A was put in question in Lake Shore Auto-
Parts v. Korzen.5 The plaintiffs in that case sought to have the amendment
set aside on fourteenth amendment equal protection grounds. The Illinois
Supreme Court was called upon to first decide the meaning of the word "in-
dividual" and then to decide the equal protection question. Through a re-
view of both the explanation of the amendment printed on the ballot and
Senate Joint Resolution No. 67, the court found that the amendment applied
to natural persons either individually or as tenants in common or joint ten-
ants.0
3. Senate Journal, May 29, 1970, p. 149. The amendment itself read:
[N]otwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, the taxation of
personal property by valuation is prohibited as to individuals.
4. SJ. No. 67, Senate Jburnal May 29, 1970, p. 149.
5. Lake Shore Auto Parts v. Korzen, 49 fll. 2d 137, 373 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
6. Id. at 148, 373 N.E.2d at 597.
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So finding, the court proceeded in its review of article IX-A to deter-
mine whether or not the discrimination that resulted from its enactment was
valid. The test formulated by the court was one based upon a rational dif-
ferentiation or classification of similar situations in the promotion of a valid
state policy. Two threshold questions were therefore raised. Was the differ-
entiation between personal property of natural persons and "non-natural"
persons rational? Once that was determined, was that differentiation fur-
thering a permissible state policy?7
In answering the first question, the court found that the amendment
classified property not according to its characteristics or its use, but solely ac-
cording to its ownership.8 As such, the court felt that, absent a clear purpose
behind the classification, the amendment was arbitrary. The court, in seeking
to find such a purpose, found that any argument raised as to the effectiveness
and uniformity of enforcement of the tax could be equally raised with re-
spect to property owned by individuals or other non-individuals. Addition-
ally, the court found that the only apparent desire of the General Assembly
was to free one set of taxpayers from the personal property tax.9 That de-
sire, absent a rational relationship to the measure taken, was not sufficient
to pass the requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
On further appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the find-
ing of discrimination and remanded the cause to the Illinois Supreme Court.10
On remand, the Illinois Supreme Court, in extrapolating on the areas still
subject to the tax, stated that "'ustees and other fiduciaries, whether corpo-
rate or not, do not own property as natural persons, and they were not ex-
empted from taxation by article IX-A."'' 1 Therefore article IX-A of the
1870 Illinois Constitution, through judicial construction has been held not to
exempt "trustees and other fiduciaries." Article IX, section 5(b) of the Illi-
nois Constitution of 1970 provides that any ad valorem personal property tax
abolished on or before its effective date shall not be reinstated.
ARTICLE IX, SECTION 5 (c) OF THE 1970 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION
Article IX, section 5(c) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides:
7. Id. at 150, 373 N.E.2d at 599.
8. Id. at 151, 373 N.E.2d at 599.
9. Id.
10. Lelnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973). In reversing
the Illinois Supreme Court, the Court examined a long line of cases dealing with the
permissible limits of state discrimination in its taxing power. The primary reason for
reversal was the failure of the plaintiff's to overcome the presumption of reasonableness
of Article IX-A. Indeed, the court felt that the state had established a "rational relation
to a state policy by a showing of the lack of uniformity of enforcement of the tax as
to persons. At the same time, the Court noted, the enforcement of the taxes as to cor-
porations was nearly uniform.
11. Lake Shore Auto Parts v. Korzen, 54 111. 2d 237, 239, 296 N.E.2d 324, 34
(1973?.
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On or before January 1, 1979, the General Assembly by law shall
abolish all ad valorem personal property taxes and concurrently
therewith and thereafter shall replace all revenue lost by units of
local government and school districts as a result of the abolition of
ad valorem personal property taxes subsequent to January 2, 1971.
The Illinois Supreme Court has considered this provision in Elk Grove En-
gineering v. Korzen. 12 The Court had before it for the first time the question
of the construction of article IX, section 5. The act in question in Elk Grove
had attempted to exempt from taxation all personal property of a person used
entirely for farm purposes. Article IX, section 5, provides the enabling
power for the General Assembly to tax personal property. Section 5(a) pro-
vides for the classification of property by valuation. It also empowers the
General Assembly to abolish the tax on any or all property and to levy taxes
in lieu of the personal property tax. It was argued by the defendants that
the classification of the property was by its use, not its ownership.' 3 Section
5(c), they argued, referred to classes of ownership, while section 5(a) re-
ferred to classes of use.' 4 Therefore, since the exemption was based on the
class of use, the mandate of revenue replacement did not apply.
Plaintiff on appeal argued that the question of whether section 5(a) or
5(c) was binding was best determined by looking to the constitutional con-
vention. Upon examination, they argued that the convention, when it used
the term "classes", meant classes of taxpayers.15 So that under either 5(a)
or 5(c), the term refers to the taxpayer and not necessarily to the use to
which he puts the property.16
Agreeing with that contention, the court determined that 5(c) included
5(a). 5(a), the court found, provided only the authority for the legislature
to value, assess and abolish taxation on personal property.' 7 5(c) limited
the procedure by which the legislature could abolish ad valorem taxation and
also mandated the abolition. The mandate, therefore, is two fold: abolish
by 1979 and replace when abolishing.
At issue in the Elk Grove case was whether or not an exemption or de-
duction was equivalent to an abolition so as to bring the measure under the
provision. The court, stating first that an exemption or deduction has the
same practical effect as an abolition, ruled that exemptions granted to in-
dividuals and deductions given to reduce property values both come under
the provision.' 8 Therefore any such exemption or deduction, if enacted sub-
12. 55 II1. 2d 393, 304 N.E.2d 65 (1973).
13. Id. at 397, 304 N.E.2d at 70.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 399, 304 N.E.2d at 71.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 406, 304 N.E.2d at 72.
18. Id. at 406, 304 N.E.2d at 72.
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sequent to the effective date of article IX, section 5(c), must be accompanied
by a replacement tax on the class thereby exempted. 19
PUBLIC ACT 1250 DISTINGUISHED
Elk Grove coupled with Lake Shore Auto Parts therefore creates a di-
lemma for the courts in construing Public Act 1250 and for trustees and other
fiduciaries in performing their duties. The Act appears to be an attempt by
the General Assembly to clarify its intent in drafting and submitting article
IX-A to the voters. The Illinois Supreme Court, in intepreting that provi-
sion, has excluded trustees and other fiduciaries from article IX-A. In enact-
ing Public Act 1250 the General Assembly is attempting to place them within
the prohibition. The question that surely will arise is whether or not their
attempt is an abolition of the personal property tax on a class of people other
than that covered by article IX-A. Under Elk Grove, that interpretation
could easily be justified.
Like Elk Grove, it could reasonably be argued that the attempted ex-
emption is an abolition of the personal property tax on a class of people sub-
sequent to the effective date of the 1970 constitution. The act involved in
Elk Grove attempted substantially the same thing. Since both acts have ef-
fective dates subsequent to the effective date of the 1970 constitution, Elk
Grove would seem to require that P.A. 1250 be ruled unconstitutional. Un-
der such an interpretation trustees and other fiduciaries would still be subject
to the personal property tax on property they hold in their respective capaci-
ties.
A persuasive case could also be made to hold the Act to be a clarifica-
tion. In his dissent to Lake Shore Auto Parts,20 Justice Goldenhersh pre-
sents two situations which provide a sound basis for holding P.A. 1250 to
be a clarification. First, the use of trustees, long held to be a valid and ef-
fective way to dispose of property, would be curtailed. Property, while ex-
empt when held by an individuial, would be subject to tax on transfer to a
trustee, even though the beneficial interest remained in the individual own-
er. 21 The second situation that proves troublesome to Justice Goldenhersh
is that of decedents' estates. While the testator lives, the property is not tax-
able. Once letters of administration issue, it would be taxable. Upon distri-
bution it would again be exempted. 2 2 Again, no rational basis exists for the
non-exemption. The use of the property remains the same.
With a rational basis for exempting trustees and other fiduciaries from
the personal property tax within the limited context of the Act, it would ap-
19. Id.
20. 54 Il. 2d 237, 239, 296 N.E.2d 324, 343 (1973).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 240, 296 N.E.2d at 343.
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pear that the court could distinguish Elk Grove from a case challenging P.A.
1250. The exemptions and deductions challenged in Elk Grove were not di-
rectly tied to the Revenue Act prior to the effective date of the 1970 consti-
tution. Instead, they were attempts to create new exemptions and deduc-
tions not previously considered. P.A. 1250 does not suffer that defect. In-
stead, it is tied directly to the adoption of article IX-A and the interpretation
given to it by the court in Lake Shore Auto Parts.
The court, in construing the Act, should give great weight to this distinc-
tion. Absent the adoption of article IX, section 5(c), there would be no
question of the Act's validity. By considering the fact that the Act appears
to be in direct response to Lake Shore Auto Parts' holding, the court should
give less weight to the fact that the effective date of the legislation is subse-
quent to the 1970 Constitution. Instead, it should focus its concern on the
rationale of having trustees and other fiduciaries exempted. In so viewing
the Act, it would appear that article IX, section 5(c) is inapplicable.
In Secco v. Chicago Transit Authority,23 Justice Robson speaking for a
unanimous court said: "Our courts have held that if the language of a statute
admits of two constructions, one of which makes the enactment mischevious,
if not absurd, and the other renders it reasonable and wholesome, the con-
struction leading to an absurd result should be avoided." Such a construction
is appropriate here. Additionally, in a report sent to registered voters before
the referendum on article IX-A, the legislature said that they believed "That
personal property which is owned by or held in a fiduciary capacity for the
benefit of natural persons is exempted from taxes."' 24 The court in Lake
Shore Auto Parts ignored that belief.
CONCLUSION
The validity of Public Act 1250 will certainly be put before the court.
While Elk Grove would seem to require that the court invalidate the Act,
for the reasons given, this writer believes that a case under the Act could
be easily distinguished. The court, when put to the test, must ulitmately bal-
ance the harm done by not exempting trsutees and other fiduciaries against
the lost revenue caused by the exemption. In striking that balance, the court
should pay close attention to Justice Goldenhersh's dissent.
C. RONALD COOK
23. 2 111. App. 2d 239, 246, 119 N.E.2d 471, 475 (1954).
24. Letter from Daniel Walker to the Members of the House of Representatives,
78th General Assembly, September 7, 1974.
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